

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Segregation in Mandatory Jerusalem and economic interests

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In the study of the Mandate period, Jewish-Arab relations are often discussed as having existed between two populations living within one political framework. Over time, several schools of thought have developed regarding these relations. As part of her methodological analysis of the historiography of the Mandate period, Aviva Halamish identifies the first three approaches that emerged, in chronological order.[1] The first approach is the dual society: according to this approach, Jews and Arabs lived alongside each other in two separate societies whose points of contact were limited mainly to the economic sphere. This dual society was characterized by separate systems, involving different levels of wages, income, education, political institutionalization, and more.[2] Nevertheless, with regards to the dual society the difference between the notions of segregation and separation should be emphasized. Thus, various studies analyzing a dual society show how the systems tend to interact with one another within different frameworks of activity.[3] According to Jacob Metzer, the case of the economic fabric in Mandatory Palestine is not different in this respect, despite the unique characteristics of the Zionist case in relation to colonial settlements.[4]

The second approach identified by Halamish is the critical school: some researchers, especially those with a postcolonial perspective, such as Gershon Shafir and Michael Shalev, criticize the dual society approach. According to them, segregation was inherent in the process of nationalist-Zionist settlement in a land that was already inhabited, leading to conflict. In this process the Labor movement is identified as a central factor in the segregation between the two populations in the labor market. Terms such as 'Hebrew labor' (*avoda 'ivrit*) and 'conquest of labor' were, according to Shafir and Shalev, a strategic response to the economic difficulties and the competition in the labor market posed by Arab workers affiliated with the labor movement.[5] It should be noted that according to Shafir, too, who rejects the concept of a dual society as characterizing the case of Palestine, and suggests a description of two economies that undergo 'a turbulent process of bifurcation within a clearly interconnected framework', also rejects the concept of separatism, regarding it primarily as a national movement's political strategy.[6]

The third and last approach consists of the shared life school: as part of the development of 'history from below' toward the end of the 1990s, several works were

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published presenting various aspects of everyday life in which the two societies shared a common existence during the Mandate period. These works reflect close relations between the two populations – particularly among those who were not part of the political leadership. These close relations were primarily limited to the economic sphere.[7] To 'history from below' we should add another school that has developed in recent years that regards the everyday life and the local identity shared by Jews and Arabs as an important factor in the continued connection between the two populations, even after 1929. Among the proponents of this approach are Abigail Jacobson, Moshe Naor, Menachem Klein, Salim Tamari and Vincent Lemire.[8]

Against this theoretical background, in this article I seek to ask how we should frame – mainly in terms of historiography – the development of segregation among local merchants in Jerusalem. These merchants still adhered to social-economic norms derived from the Ottoman period, and their motives were primarily economic, while at the same time, they sought to utilize the official policy of Zionist leadership institutions.

My main argument is that this type of segregation demonstrates how merchants, who had previously engaged in trade relations with Arabs and had a local identity in common with them, might have demanded separation because of economic interests, such as economic competition, in a way that was facilitated by official national policy whose motive was ideological. This type of segregation aligns in some ways with Shafir's approach, that emphasizes the material-economic element as an important factor – but not completely, as he stresses the political strategy behind this segregation.

Jerusalem was chosen as a case study for this article precisely because of its central place in the study of local identities shared by Jews and Arabs, whose roots are found in the Ottoman period. A number of studies have dealt with the influence of local identity among Jerusalem's residents – Jews and non-Jews – arising from their connection to Jerusalem's shared urban space.[9] This identity was strengthened against the backdrop of modernization processes that occurred in the city in the late Ottoman period.[10] These studies have addressed different aspects of that local identity: the emergence of joint economic initiatives, intellectual connections, shared commercial activity, and shared public spaces in which vibrant economic and social activity took place. Various researchers have highlighted the influence of this identity as a factor that challenged the processes of nation-building that occurred during the Mandate period.[11]

Jerusalem's uniqueness during the Mandate period in comparison to other mixed cities with regards to the local Jewish population has been discussed in several studies (the term 'locals' in this article refers to Jews from various communities living in Jerusalem before the British conquest, who were accustomed to maintaining social and economic relations with the non-Jewish population). Kobi Cohen-Hattab points to the limitations of the activities of a Zionist body called the Hebrew Community Council in Jerusalem, which operated in various civilian areas, due to a large concentration of the Ashkenazi Old Yishuv, in contrast to Haifa, where a Jewish society with a strong sense of national belonging and mission developed, influencing the scope of activities of the Hebrew Community Council in that city.[12] Unlike Jerusalem, Anat Kidron shows how significant immigration of Jews from Europe to Haifa influenced the city's urban-modern structure and accelerated segregation processes as a

derivative of this.[13] Similarly, Deborah Bernstein and David de Vries highlighted segregation processes in Haifa's labor market during the Mandate period, due to the dominant and organized activity of the labor movement in the city.[14] In contrast to Haifa, the labor movement in Jerusalem was unsuccessful in this issue, against the backdrop of a strong shared local identity among both Jews and Arabs.[15] On the other hand, the British considered Jerusalem the capital city. This strengthened the city's political status among both sides.[16]

From the Zionist point of view, moreover, Jerusalem held an important symbolic place, and accordingly, the Zionist movement established the headquarters of national institutions such as the Jewish Agency, the Jewish National Fund and the National Council in the city.[17] We should understand the promotion by the national institutions of the construction of modern Jewish commercial centers in west Jerusalem, which deepened the economic segregation, in this light.[18] Moreover, we should assess the influence of nation-building processes that occurred in Jerusalem more than in any other mixed city. As noted, a Zionist body operated in Jerusalem on a communal basis, called the Hebrew Community Council, its predecessor in the 1920s being the City Council of the Jews of Jerusalem (Hebrew: *Va'ad ha-'Ir liyhudei Yerushalayim*; hereinafter: Va'ad). On the one hand, this body had a low public standing relative to the one in Haifa; on the other hand, it operated in a more stable and organized manner in Jerusalem than in smaller mixed cities such as Acre, Tiberias, Safed or Beit She'an.[19]

Against the backdrop of Jerusalem's uniqueness as a city where the local element was dominant while at the same time being under significant national influence, I seek to analyze the development of segregation practices in Jerusalem during the Mandate period, with emphasis on its emergence specifically among the local Jewish population while utilizing the official policy of Zionist leadership institutions. The choice to analyze the development of segregation (in the form in which it appears in this article) stems precisely from the fact that I identify in this phenomenon an expression of the tension between two components that characterize Jerusalem's uniqueness – a dominant local identity versus national influence, which was made even more significant after the events of 1929, due to the central presence of the Jewish national institutions in Jerusalem.

By focusing on economic interests specifically among the local population, this article seeks to achieve two main objectives: first, to show how segregation processes may appear actively even among populations with a local identity, and more so with assistance from Zionist institutions such as the Va'ad. This differs from the approach of 'history from below', which identifies daily practice and local identity as factors that specifically challenged the conception of economic segregation between the two populations. Second, through the examples presented in this article, I will demonstrate how economic and organizational interests in Jerusalem – specifically from within the local population – played a central role in shaping the political relationship between Jews and Arabs. This phenomenon to some extent aligns with the research approach that identifies material needs such as the labor market as an important factor in shaping the political relationship between Jews and Arabs.

This article is divided into two parts., The first part will address segregation in Jerusalem during the 1920s. In this part, I point out the failure of the labor movement

in implementing the idea of 'Hebrew labor' in Jerusalem during the 1920s, owing to local norms, while after the 1929 riots, I demonstrate how there emerged an active initiative by the local population to disengage from trade activities with Arabs. In the second part, I present various examples that show the development of segregation practices in Jerusalem in the 1930s, which were based on economic interests.

Segregation in Jerusalem in the 1920s: Zionist policy alongside spontaneous acts

Official encouragement to implement the 'Hebrew labor' policy, and even attempts to enforce it, began in Jerusalem after the British conquest, influenced by the Va'ad. The Va'ad was established by Zionist leaders Yaakov Thon and Eliezer Hoofien after the British conquest, with the aim of creating an organized leadership with a national-Zionist foundation. Throughout the 1920s, the Va'ad served as the community arm of the national institutions that were formed in the Yishuv under the name Knesset Yisrael, headed by a supreme representative body called the National Council (*Va'ad Leumi*).[20] In 1932, the name of the Va'ad was changed to the Hebrew Community Council of Jerusalem (hereinafter HCC), and legally, it was considered an official body operating on behalf of the formal institutions of the Yishuv.[21]

During the 1920s, the Va'ad's policy officially encouraged segregation. A clear case of this can be seen in the Va'ad's opposition to the British proposal to establish a joint Jewish-Arab school funded by philanthropist Sir Elly Kadoorie.[22] However, perhaps the most prominent example of this approach was the Va'ad's official policy on the issue of Hebrew labor. The Va'ad attempted to enforce this policy among local Jews, mainly under the influence of the labor movement. Nonetheless, despite the Va'ad's public standing, the Hebrew labor concept failed to become reality, and many Jews in Jerusalem continued to employ Arab workers, especially given that this was a local norm.[23] Labor movement leaders acknowledged the city's social and urban character as an important factor in this issue.[24]

However, precisely because of the strength of the local norm, which hindered the segregation policy among locals in Jerusalem during the 1920s, the development of a practice of segregation among this population, especially after the 1929 riots, is worth noting. While this practice did not emerge as part of the nation-building processes, its appearance as a tool serving economic interests, while utilizing national terminology, has historical significance that merits attention within the historiographical debate discussed above.

The research literature shows the decisive impact of the 1929 riots as a watershed moment in Jewish-Arab relations. A central proponent of this view is Hillel Cohen, who sees the events as a pivotal moment in the development of the Jewish-Arab conflict.[25] He argues that this event definitively disrupted the Jewish Arab identity as a cultural and social identity whose roots went back to the Ottoman period.[26]

Indeed, the effects of this crucial moment can be observed in the local commercial activity in Jerusalem. After the 1929 riots, there was a noticeable emergence of local initiatives calling for a boycott of Arab merchants' products. The sources of these initiatives were not necessarily rooted in nation-building processes or objective

differences between the two populations that led to the development of two separate economies, as was demonstrated in research by the dual society approach.[27] These initiatives arose from two main sources: first, deep trauma from the riots and, consequently, a refusal to engage in trade relations with Arabs. A second reason for the organization of a boycott against Arab goods was the Arab boycott of Jewish merchants, which reportedly caused several hundred Jewish families in Jerusalem to suffer economically, according to claims made by merchants who turned to the Va'ad. These merchants initially appealed to the governor of Jerusalem and to the High Commissioner. When they realized that no response would be forthcoming, they turned to the Va'ad as a last resort, stating, 'Therefore, we have decided that all merchants, in order to ease the current terrible situation, have no other remedy but for all Jews to boycott and cease purchasing any goods.' The merchants demanded that a meeting be convened, 'in which all the national institutions that are interested in this issue would participate, so that the boycott could be enacted legally'.[28] In other words, for the local merchants, the national institutions served as an official organizational tool that could assist them economically and legally in the hostile atmosphere following the 1929 riots.

The issue of mutual boycott of goods, specifically among the local population both Jewish and Arab, which for the decade prior had maintained a largely integrated shared economic relationship, aligns with a thesis in research that seeks to place material factors from the realms of economics and politics at the center of discussions about the Jewish-Arab conflict, in contrast to an emphasis on culture and ideology. Among the main proponents of this thesis are Gershon Shafir (mentioned above) and Baruch Kimmerling.[29] Shafir regards the material-economic element as an important factor in shaping society, ideology and politics. The sharp transition to discourse about boycotting Arab or Jewish goods, and the crystallization of active cooperation with the Va'ad in a manner that serves this purpose, marks a process that is essentially economic. Moreover, it was integrated with and intensified by the segregationist aspirations of the Zionist leadership institutions. This process emerged from within the local population and due to economic considerations; in practice, it led to a change in the character of the urban space. In the following examples I will demonstrate this process in various fields of commerce, primarily regarding Mahane Yehuda market.

Segregation practices in commercial activity in Jerusalem

Several examples of active segregation initiatives by local merchants from two commercial sectors, milk sellers and the vegetable market, will be presented in this section. Alongside this, I will show that simultaneously, other merchants or consumers sought to continue the local norm of maintaining joint commercial activity with Arabs.

In 1913, the Milk Sellers Association was established in Jerusalem, bringing together dozens of local milk sellers from the city, both Jewish and Arab. It was based in the Mea Shearim neighborhood.[30] After the 1929 riots, the Association of Hebrew Milk Sellers was established in Jerusalem. The members of this association were part of the local population, and its headquarters were also established in Mea Shearim.

Members sold only 'Jewish milk', and the association even published advertisements promoting the consumption of 'Jewish milk' as kosher milk, stating:

> The Association of Hebrew Milk Sellers announces that the following milk sellers have joined the association and sell only kosher Hebrew milk…. The association is confident that the public will buy only Hebrew milk and will ensure that the milk seller holds a certificate from the Hebrew Milk Sellers Association.

The advertisement listed the names of the sellers and the neighborhoods where they sold milk – such as the Bukharan Quarter, Mea Shearim, and Nachalat Zion neighborhoods – which were inhabited primarily by local Jews.[31]

This advertisement is interesting for two reasons. First, it is directed at the local population, assuming that there was a clear preference among the residents of these neighborhoods for milk sold by Jews, even though before the 1929 riots, many of these Jews purchased or sold 'non-Jewish milk'. Second, the addition of the adjectives 'kosher Hebrew' in the context of selling a product associated with the ethnic background of the seller raises questions: did Jews from Mea Shearim, for example, view milk from an Arab-owned cow as non-kosher? Furthermore, did the founders of the Association of Hebrew Milk Sellers genuinely identify ideologically with the concept of 'Hebrew products'? I argue that the fact that this association was established by locals, specifically after the 1929 riots, mainly indicates a reaction, an immediate response to the hostility shown by Arabs toward Jews during the riots, rather than a national-Zionist aspiration to strengthen the Jewish economy rather than the Arab one.

From the consumers' perspective, the presentation of the issue as a religious principle ('non-kosher milk') did not convince many among the local population, who continued to purchase milk from Arabs through various agents. This reality created economic difficulties for the association, whose leaders regarded the Va'ad as the appropriate body to address the problem, given its identity as a Zionist representative institution that encouraged the trend of separating Jews and Arabs in the urban-economic space:

> As is known, the condition of the Hebrew milk sellers, who have suffered until now from Arab competition, has slightly improved due to the propaganda carried out. But, unfortunately, we suffer from those distributing Arab milk, who deceive their customers and sell Arab milk instead of Hebrew milk…. It would suffice if you called them in and gave them a bit of moral instruction…. Many institutions still purchase Arab milk. Moshav Zekenim, Ezrat Nashim, the Blind School in Misgav Ladach, and above all, the Maternity Aid Society, which, as a provocation, distributes Arab milk. As we discussed with their representative, we hope for your assistance in this matter. We hope that the Va'ad, as the representative of the Jerusalem Yishuv, will take an interest in all our issues, as this is a matter that affects many families.[32]

Against this backdrop, a general assembly of the association was held at the Va'ad's offices. It was decided to issue a proclamation stating that the milk coming from Arab villages was non-kosher milk (*halav akum*) and also damaging to brotherly love, as expressed in the Torah: 'And your brother shall live with you' (*ve-hai ahikha imkha*). It was further noted that an additional reason was that the livelihood of many families would be harmed.[33]

As mentioned, the expectation that local Jews would buy only 'Jewish milk' was not realized, even after the riots, and this included not only individual Jews but also

public institutions, some of which, such as the School for the Blind, were under the Va'ad's auspices. In this context, the novelty of this issue lies in the very organization of local Jewish merchants, whose purpose was to boycott Arab products and promote their own businesses under a national label: Hebrew milk. At the core of the association leaders' appeal to the Va'ad was not a national consideration, but rather an economic concern: 'Many families depend on this.' In other words, this practice primarily emerged from economic competition against those who traded with Arabs, but its practical effect was the promotion of a segregation policy by local merchants, with the expectation of receiving support from the national institutions.

Another example of the development of this practice after the 1929 riots can be seen in the vegetable market. Following the 1929 riots, the Va'ad served as a central body for assisting Jews in Jerusalem and the surrounding areas in various ways.[34] One of them was the supply of vegetables, which in many cases had been purchased wholesale from Arab traders operating in the Old City. After the riots, Jewish merchants stopped going to the Old City. Given the circumstances, several merchants from three local markets, Mea Shearim, the Bukharan Market and Mahane Yehuda, turned to the Va'ad for help.[35] The Va'ad coordinated an agreement between the merchants and Jewish agents who supplied the goods, stipulating that the merchants were obligated to purchase only from these agents, under the Va'ad's supervision.[36] However, some merchants who were not bound by the Va'ad's agreement returned to the Old City to buy at lower prices. In response, the merchants complained to the heads of the Va'ad: 'We ask that the Council for the Jews of Jerusalem monitor the new vegetable merchants who are going to the city to buy from the Arabs.'[37]

This letter illustrates how the 1929 riots served as a significant turning point in the merchants' conduct. From their perspective this was not a national decision aimed at strengthening the Jewish economy, but rather a psychological and security difficulty in maintaining a normal relationship with Arab merchants in light of the events. In other words, it was an immediate and, to some extent, natural response to the riots. This difficulty is sharpened by the sense of humiliation, as seen in the letter, and it also led to financial losses, prompting the merchants to seek the support of the Va'ad, a body that advocated for segregation. Of particular note is the way in which these merchants responded to Jewish merchants who chose to continue buying in the Old City – by attempting to leverage the influence and political power of the Va'ad to restrict the activities of those who continued to collaborate with Arab merchants.

As mentioned, the sale of milk and vegetables are examples of how the 1929 riots encouraged a trend of segregation practices in commercial activities. It seems that the novelty of this trend lies in the fact that the initiative came from local merchants who had previously maintained regular trade relations with the Arabs. This practice would increasingly manifest during the 1930s, serving economic interests, as further examples in the next section will show.

Segregation practices in Jerusalem in the 1930s

A year after the riots, with the Va'ad's assistance, a formal market of 81 shops was inaugurated in Mahane Yehuda. On the Va'ad's behalf, Shmuel Meir Mosheioff, the Va'ad's secretary, primarily facilitated various procedures related to the market's

establishment. As part of this process, a regulation was drafted, including a clause prohibiting the rental of shops to non-Jews.[38] However, after the market opened, shops were rented to Arab women, who operated them on the Sabbath. In response, shop owners selling fruits and vegetables demanded enforcement of the prohibition against renting shops to non-Jews, as stipulated in the regulations. Their argument was that the Arab women sold their goods at lower prices. It is important to note that the merchants also requested the removal of Jewish vendors who sold cheaply in open areas.[39] However, unlike those Jewish merchants, the Arab women sold their wares in a shop as required by law. In both cases, the merchants' motivation was economic, but in the case of the Arab women, they invoked the regulation prohibiting the rental of shops to non-Jews.

Unlike buying from merchants in the Old City, which was characterized by physical distance between the Jewish neighborhoods and the Old City, the example of Arab women selling goods in Mahane Yehuda market is particularly interesting in terms of local norms. Jerusalem memoir literature is replete with descriptions of fellah women selling their goods at the end of the Ottoman period in Valero Square (later the location of Mahane Yehuda market). Their presence was considered one of the market's defining features. A colorful expression of this is the description of fellah women offering their goods in Yiddish to residents from the nearby neighborhoods, as recalled by those who lived near the market.[40] The shared activity in the Mahane Yehuda market, similar to the establishment of an urban center at the exit of Jaffa Gate at the end of the nineteenth century, should be seen as part of a local identity that stemmed from the daily lived experience of the area's natives. Menachem Klein views the joint economic activity that developed during that period as an expression of the Jewish Arab identity that emerged at the same time.[41]

Against the backdrop of this quintessentially Jerusalem scene, within a space deeply local in character, the significance of the initiative led by local Jewish merchants to expel the Arab women sellers, even though they had rented shops lawfully, cannot be overstated. My argument is that the segregation practice of those local merchants was fundamentally based on economic competition with the Arabs, which was derived from the nationalist tension following the 1929 riots, but not from a rigid ideological approach that sought to create two separate economic systems. The connection that formed between the merchants and a Zionist body like the Va'ad reflects their need for assistance in that economic competition, more than it reflects identification with the segregation concept that the Va'ad, as I showed, sought to lead during the 1920s. This phenomenon of national motive fueling economic interest was demonstrated by Deborah Bernstein's theory regarding the split labor market in Haifa (see below), as she views material interests as a driving force, alongside nationalism, that changed the order of material reality.[42]

This practice resurfaced four years later when Jewish merchants sought to expel Arab merchants who had lawfully rented spaces in the market from a Jew named Yom Tov Sharim. In the Arabic-language newspaper *Falastin* dated 27 February 1936, an article titled 'The Decision to Ban Arabs from the Vegetable Market Causes Discontent among Jerusalem Residents' was published. The writer describes how a Jewish landlord, named Sharim, rented out several warehouses for vegetable sales. The writer notes that 'it was natural that both Arab and Jewish vendors would come

in exchange for the rent he received from them'. As the number of Arab renters grew, Jewish merchants tried to prevent the Arabs from entering the space. The author adds that the Jewish merchants forgot that trade was free and that no law prohibited a person from selling goods to anyone, further noting that the Jewish merchants had also forgotten that Jewish merchants operated in Arab neighborhoods. He links this situation to the Zionist movement's political effort to 'swallow an entire Arab land'. The issue reached the mayor, who issued an order preventing Arabs from renting the shops, causing outrage. Nevertheless, the Jewish warehouse owner, Sharim, continued renting the shops to Arabs. According to Sharim, jealousy was the underlying motive behind the attempt to stop the Arabs from renting shops.[43]

The article shows, on the one hand, that in the 1930s the presence of Arabs in a Jewish market was considered natural, while on the other hand, it demonstrates a joint initiative by several Jewish merchants to exclude Arab merchants. Interestingly, while the Jewish merchants' motivation was economic, the writer of the article chose to link this event to the Zionist movement. In contrast, Sharim and other merchants upheld local norms, as described above.

This event should also be understood against the backdrop of both the escalation in Jewish-Arab tensions following the outbreak of the Arab Revolt, and the strengthening of the trend of purchasing Hebrew products in the Yishuv and the Jewish economy in general. However, as Dotan Greenwald shows, in the case of Jerusalem, unlike the general trend in the Yishuv, there was still a consumer preference to buy from Arab merchants.[44] This picture, as presented by Greenwald, reinforces the understanding that a distinction should be made between consumers and merchants. The comparison between the two strengthens the understanding of the significance of the economic motive as a factor that not only challenged Zionist propaganda ('Hebrew products') but also reinforced segregation processes and integrated into nation-building processes.

Given the existence of this practice among the market's merchants, it is important to present a declaration signed by dozens of shop owners who rented their shops to Arab women. The declaration stated:

> We, the undersigned, request that the Arab women selling vegetables in Mahane Yehuda be allocated shops next to our own in the new stores recently built by the City Council. We believe this is for the benefit and development of the market, and we will be grateful to all those who assist us in this matter.[45]

The publication of this declaration, which essentially called for advocating for the continued presence of the Arab women, something that until recently had been considered an unquestioned local norm, reflects the public influence, albeit unofficial, of the economic nature of this kind of segregation. This case demonstrates that economic considerations, often discussed in research as a central factor in fostering closeness, can also serve as a major element in a segregation process. Although the debate among shop owners was not purely ethnically or nationally motivated, but rather an economic dispute (since the Arab women sold goods at lower prices), I nevertheless claim that leveraging the Va'ad's public standing to promote some of the merchants' economic interests manifests a process through which the economic interest of local Oriental Jews entwined with national policy.

In her work on labor market relations in Israel, Deborah Bernstein illustrates how Jewish workers, led by the Histadrut, a general labor union, endeavored to block Arab workers from entering the Jewish sector by using the economic and political support of the Zionist institutions. Bernstein identifies the response of Jewish workers as fitting into Edna Bonacich's theory of split labor markets, where competition for jobs between two groups of workers with different wage levels leads employers to prefer cheaper labor, naturally displacing higher-cost workers. In such circumstances, higher-cost workers attempt to prevent their displacement by using various strategies, including professional organization and proximity to political centers, advantages that enable higher-cost workers to prevent the entry of competing labor forces.[46]

The presence of Arab traders and the responses of store owners seem to parallel Bonacich's model. Store owners selling higher-priced goods sought to prevent the presence of Arab traders by leveraging proximity to political-Zionist centers such as the Va'ad, which had proven effective in civil matters, including initial assistance in establishing shops. Another similarity can be observed between the Jewish and Arab workers examined by Bernstein and the Mahane Yehuda market: in both cases, there is a clear alignment between the specific goal of the workers and merchants – preventing the entry of Arab workers/merchants into the Jewish labor market in a 'mixed city' – and the overall orientation of Yishuv institutions.[47]

As mentioned, in the case of the market one can see clearly how local merchants who were used to viewing the presence of Arab merchants as part of the human landscape sought, out of economic motives, to exclude these merchants in a manner that effectively shaped a reality of segregation, a phenomenon that aligned with the principles of the national institutions' leadership. This case is an example of instances during the Mandate period where a business motivation or other material factors intersected with processes of nation building in a mutually beneficial manner. These cases have been discussed in various studies in recent years from both the Jewish and Arab perspectives. From the Jewish side, Nachum Karlinsky connects technology and private entrepreneurship – which have nothing to do with national frameworks – to national processes that deepened the economic divide between the two societies.[48] From the Arab side, Sherene Seikaly demonstrates how Palestinian businessmen used nationalism in a flexible way to protect their interests.[49]

For the purposes of this article, the importance of these works lies in the connection between business and economic activity and processes of nation-building, even if indirectly. From this perspective, it seems that the response of Jewish merchants in the market – which primarily reflected a pure economic motive while encouraging processes of economic segregation – aligns with the general perception emerging from research that positions commercial activity and private initiative as an active factor in shaping national identity, despite this being a population that had local-identity characteristics and that is commonly seen as challenging the dual approach.

Another example of the connection between economic activity and the promotion of Hebrew labor can be seen in burial services. Burial activities in Jerusalem, more than any other religious activity, were known for their commercial and loosely regulated nature. During the Mandate period, over twenty communal *hevra kadisha* burial societies operated in Jerusalem.[50] In the late 1920s, the idea of establishing a general *hevra kadisha* under the jurisdiction of the Va'ad was proposed in a Va'ad meeting.

It was argued that founding such a society would be challenging because of family traditions related to burial and the longstanding operations of old and local burial societies. Nonetheless, it was noted that the initiative would be valuable in the context of 'Hebrew labor':

> The matter is of great importance because of the question of labor in cemeteries, which is carried out by Arabs. This is, of course, inappropriate. Perhaps with the new arrangement, we will succeed in introducing Hebrew labor into this field.[51]

The Va'ad failed to establish its own burial society, but later, during the 1930s, one named *Hevra Kadisha Gahasha Kehilat Yerushalayim* (hereinafter: the Society) was founded. Some of the key figures involved in establishing the Society were Gad Frumkin, later a Supreme Court judge; Haim Salomon, a leader of the HCC; and Mordechai Eliash, the legal advisor to the National Council. The Society was characterized by its nationalistic operational patterns, such as the issue of inscriptions on tombstones: according to the Society's regulations, it was forbidden to inscribe tombstones in foreign languages, including using Gregorian dates.[52] However, the process of founding the Society was not simple. It had to compete for clients against longstanding Jerusalem burial societies that had the trust of many local Jews, especially from the Sephardi community. This led to propaganda among the competing societies, using ideological and religious arguments.

In an attempt to recruit clients from among Jewish Agency employees, Israel Bardaki (a descendant of one of the first Ashkenazi families to immigrate to Jerusalem at the beginning of the nineteenth century), the Society's secretary, highlighted its advantage over other burial societies, positioning it as one that promoted Hebrew labor.[53] Indeed, this policy of employing only Jewish workers in the burial process was presented as the official policy of the National Council.[54] It should be noted that the use of Arab workers as gravediggers is not a halachic issue; this practice was common and is still followed today by the Sephardi *hevra kadisha* and other societies.[55] Indeed, the Society employed Arab workers after the Six-Day War.[56]

It is particularly interesting to see how local *hevra kadisha* societies promoted negative propaganda against the Society. This propaganda included claims that the Society did not adhere to Jerusalem customs; it was also alleged that the Society employed Arab workers.[57] In reality, however, the Society, at least relative to other burial societies, maintained a policy of Hebrew labor.[58] It is very likely that the same local companies that accused the Society of employing Arab workers were themselves doing so, as was customary at the time. For our purposes, this propaganda issued by local companies aligns with how Hebrew labor was presented as a practical tool in the economic competition between business organizations.

Another example of this practice related to burial can be seen in the case of a tombstone company owned by Meir Gross, a stonemason. The heads of the Society accused Gross of using 'foreign stones' (stones engraved by non-Jews). In response, Gross appealed to the Society's president, claiming to know the 'source of the despicable slander' and that the accusation came from people 'who want to be the only ones in this business'. Gross firmly denied ever using 'foreign stone', insisting that he was a 'national Jew who knows his national duties'. He further asserted that the accusation was an attempt at libel by a person interested in taking away his

livelihood, and he demanded that this person be brought to trial at the Jewish Agency 'for such a vile libel'.[59] Gross's framing of the issue as a defamatory attack on his good name echoes similar incidents during the Mandate period, in which Jews were suspected of employing Arab workers.[60]

An additional example is the case of a gravel factory in Jerusalem that employed four Jewish families. In 1933, at the initiative of the HCC, a joint organization of contractors was established 'with the aim of employing Jewish laborers'. In a letter to the HCC, the gravel factory's manager claimed that the new organization approached a man by the name of Mann, known as the 'representative of the Ashkenazi gravel factory owners', while his own factory was boycotted on the grounds that it was not Jewish-owned, despite his providing evidence to the HCC that the factory was indeed owned by Jews, according to the letter. In the letter, the factory owner emphasized the ethnic tensions, arguing that this was a display of hostility toward the only Sephardi-owned gravel factory: 'It is unfair that a general contractors' organization, created at the initiative of the HCC, representing all Jews in Jerusalem, should highlight animosity against the only Sephardi gravel factory owner.'[61] Unfortunately, I have not found the HCC's response to this letter (if one was issued). Nonetheless, from the factory owner's statements, it is interesting to see how his portrayal of the events within the framework of competition with other factories aligns with the practice at the center of this article.

In conclusion, I argue that the practical trend of economic separation was not necessarily a result of inherent developmental differences between Jewish and Arab societies in the Mandate period, as posited by the dual economy thesis. Moreover, these examples do not necessarily align with the research trend that seeks to uncover close relations from a 'history from below' perspective. Instead, they show how economic competition and the business considerations of local Jews – who had previously engaged in trade relations with Arabs – might lead to a segregation which was facilitated by official national policy.

Conclusion

As mentioned, the choice in this article to deal with segregation in Jerusalem stems from its unique character as a city that on one hand is characterized by a dominant local identity rooted in the late Ottoman period, and on the other hand has an important symbolic status in the Zionist movement. An expression of this was the establishment of the seats of Zionist national institutions in Jerusalem, which influenced the shaping of the city's spatial character, including the issue of segregation. The perception of segregation as a Zionist policy aspiring to separate spaces has been discussed in research in various fields, and its appearance is prominent mainly in new settlements such as the city of Tel Aviv and the agricultural *moshavot*. A more complex reality regarding the implementation of segregation policy by the Zionist leadership was obtained in mixed cities. A prominent characteristic examined in mixed cities in this context is the existence of tension between local norms, aspiring to preserve shared space between Jews and Arabs, and Zionist policy, aspiring to create a separate Jewish space. This tension increased against the background of significant Zionist immigration.[62]

Two central cities that fit this description of tension are Haifa and Jerusalem. In Haifa, a dominant Zionist community developed that encompassed the Jews of the city while creating separate space in accordance with the Zionist vision. In contrast, in Jerusalem, the creation of separate spaces was expressed mainly in the establishment of new neighborhoods founded by Zionist immigrants, such as Talpiot and Beit Hakerem, and not the Jewish community as a whole. What is common to both these cities is the fact that the shaping of public space in accordance with the segregation policy occurred mainly through active initiatives of Zionist immigrants that provided for their needs and reflected the Zionist policy.[63] The examples in this article present an exceptional picture, both in relation to the discussion of segregation processes in mixed cities and in relation to the historiographical discussion on the question of the nature of the relationship between the two societies, Jewish and Arab. In this light, this article sought to answer the question of how to frame the development of segregation in Jerusalem among local merchants while receiving political assistance from Zionist bodies that operated in the city.

In analyzing the segregation process in the labor market as reflected in this article, I pointed to the importance of competition over material resources, rather than ideological interests or local identity. The Jerusalem case as presented in this article should be analyzed as part of the question of the roots of the appearance of the ideas of 'Hebrew labor'/'conquest of labor'. According to Yosef Gorni, the ideology of Hebrew labor grew from the idea of mobilizing the productivity of the Jewish masses in the Diaspora and subsequently was perceived as a condition for the independent and self-reliant existence of Jewish society in the Land of Israel. That is, at the foundation of this ideology was the aspiration for comprehensive national independence. In contrast to Gorni's approach is the approach that seeks to stress the economic aspect in light of the direct encounter of Zionist immigrants with the reality in Palestine, as presented at the beginning of the article: According to Baruch Kimmerling, there are economic elements in the 'conquest of labor', but he adds that the conflict in the labor market was intertwined with the national struggle between Jews and Arabs. As noted above, Shafir sees the issue of 'Hebrew labor' as a conception that primarily reflects an economic survival struggle at the center of which is first and foremost the issue of Jewish-Arab conflict, whose resolution depends on the existence of the Jewish workers' community. The characterization of economic considerations in the examples in this article is particularly salient, given the local identity of the merchants. At the same time, it is worth emphasizing the 1929 riots as an event that largely refined the development of this phenomenon. At this stage, the Zionist leadership in the city served as an address for assistance for those merchants seeking economic protection while excluding Arab merchants. In this, I seek to emphasize the centrality of the material struggle as Shafir shows, but not necessarily as a struggle rooted in political interest, but rather as one in which the development of political tension is inevitably intertwined with competition over material resources, as Kimmerling suggests. An important and critical characteristic in this process is the way in which Jews with local identity found economic support in Zionist ideology, an interesting phenomenon in itself in which we can see the emergence of solidarity of marginal groups in the Yishuv (who were not purely identified with the Zionist movement) with the general aspirations of the Zionist leadership.

Sociological research points to the attempt of the organized Yishuv to create a community in which the Jewish element and the Zionist element – the boundaries between which had already become blurred in Mandatory Palestine – were not only a matter of collective identity, but also an organizing principle for protecting the rights of community members, as a collective, against foreign (British) rule and the Arab majority. These community rights included work, health and education services. According to Baruch Kimmerling, the reason for constructing these rights and granting them as services (even if not equally) was not only concern for community members but the Yishuv's aspiration to achieve maximum autonomy and independence from the mandatory state and to build a state within a state within the context of the triangle of British-Arab-Jewish relations.[64] From this point of view, the examples in this article can be regarded as a phenomenon in which marginal groups received economic protection from Zionist leadership in a manner that facilitated the Zionist movement's aim of creating an autonomous and distinct Jewish society.

The choice in this article to examine Jerusalem as a case study was made primarily in light of the influence of local identity in Jerusalem as a mixed city, alongside the centrality of the city in Zionist thought and activity, as demonstrated on a communal basis by the Va'ad's activity. The impact of the shared local identity was expressed by the Va'ad's failure to implement a policy of Hebrew labor among the local population during the 1920s, due to Jerusalem's local identity as a city where Jews and Arabs shared the economic-social fabric of life. Precisely because of this, it is interesting to see the development of segregation among that very same population after the events of 1929; the element of economic competition between the two populations stands out in this development, involving the boycotting of the other's merchants by each side.

Starting from this competition and concern for the economic interests of Jewish merchants, it is important to point out that the cooperation between these local merchants and the Va'ad formed a way for the merchants' interests to align with the segregationist aspirations of the Zionist leadership. With the assistance of the national institutions, economic competition overcame the previous local identity, and as a result, influenced the character of the relationship between Jews and Arabs in public spaces such as the Mahane Yehuda market.

Through these examples, the article shows how economic considerations can present a more dynamic picture in two aspects: the local aspect, in the sense that economic motives can overcome local identity and thus became integrated with the general segregation policy that the Zionist movement sought to promote, and the ideological aspect, in the sense that one can see how the shaping of the relationship between Jews and Arabs in public space can be a derivative of competition over material resources and not necessarily due to rigid ideological frameworks. In reference to these two aspects, the article shows how the development of the relationship between the two populations in Mandatory Jerusalem might be determined by diverse considerations – local-identity, economic and ideological – and it seems that the interweaving of these considerations is dynamic. Thus, Mandatory Jerusalem offers us an opportunity to examine unique segregation processes that do not necessarily align with segregation patterns that existed at the level of the Yishuv as a whole.

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